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This thesis researches the effect of agency costs on abnormal stock returns of bidders during the 
M&A-announcement period. According to agency theory, principal-agency costs may be 
mitigated if the shareholders (the principal) appropriately monitor the management (the agent) to 
ensure value-enhancing decision-making. In particular, an influential owner who actively monitors 
the management should be less likely to spend excess cash reserves poorly, or engage in value 
destructive investments such as acquisitions. Consequently, we expect bidders with strong owners 
to (1) perform better in acquisitions, and that (2) cash stockpiles are managed better relative to 
bidders with dispersed ownership. However, gaining too much control of a firm could cause 
controlling shareholders to engage in activities and transactions that benefit themselves at the 
expense of minority shareholders. Thus, principal-principal costs arise as the controlling 
shareholder seeks ways to benefit themselves at the expense of the minority shareholders. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that (3) it is better to have a strong owner than a dispersed ownership 
concentration, yet too much control is worse than having a strong minority owner without complete 
control.   
Through an event study we analyze our hypotheses by a sample of 1.083 acquisitions across the 
Nordics from 2011 to 2020. Methodically, we design one measure of ownership concentration to 
test our two first initial hypotheses, and another design to test the third. We find clear evidence of 
a positive correlation between concentrated ownership and abnormal stock return during the 
announcement period. Whether we find evidence that bidders with strong owners manage their 
cash positions better is a question of what we accept in terms of significance. Moreover, our sample 
gives clear indications of a principal-principal issue. However, agent-principal issues seem to 
outweigh principal-principal issues. In our sample, bidders with a Controlling majority 
outperformed bidders with dispersed ownership, but a Large minority owner outperformed them 
both. Our results give evidence of a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and 
bidder performance of firms with excess cash reserves. When the largest shareholder becomes too 
influential, our data shows that they influence the management negatively compared to firms with 
a large minority owner. Moreover, we observe indications of an opposite effect with respect to 
governmental owners. 
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1  Introduction 
A corporate takeover is one of the largest and most important investment decisions a firm can 
undertake (Betton, Eckbo & Thorburn, 2008).  The outcome of a corporate takeover is there of 
high importance for the companies that initiate them. Thus, they have been extensively researched 
by academics for a long period of time.  
There are several reasons to why firms initiate corporate takeovers. The main reasons are synergies 
in the form of revenue growth or cost reductions to increase profits. (Gauhgan, 2007). By acquiring 
and integrating another firm’s assets or resources into its own operations, a firm can increase 
profits in two ways; (1) increase sales of existing products, and (2) become more efficient and thus 
reduce costs.  
Academics usually look for empirical evidence of abnormal stock returns at acquisition 
announcement to evaluate a company’s decision of acquiring another firm. Former studies have 
shown that most of the wealth transfer usually goes to the target which sees their stock rise, while 
the bidder return averages around 1 % (Betton et al., (2008); Dessaint, Eckbo, and Golubov 
(2020)).  A common explanation for this is that the bidder usually must pay a large premium to 
acquire a company. If the price is such that the bidder’s net present value (NPV) of the investment 
is zero, all gains of the takeover will go the target (Gugler, Mueller & Yurtoglu, 2008).  
Several researchers have examined agency costs as the source of bidder’s poor performance 
relative to targets. Agency costs are costs that arise when a principal delegates decision-making 
authority to an agent, and the agent undertake actions that conflicts with the principal’s best interest 
due to misaligned incentives. In this context, the shareholders are the principal while the 
management is the agent. The management may pursue projects that is in their own interest at the 
expense of shareholders, namely by pursuing projects that does not maximize shareholder 
(principal) value. This may be done in the form of undertaking sub-optimal, or even value-
destroying acquisitions. Consequently, shareholders can reduce this behaviour by actively monitor 
the management to ensure value-enhancing decisions.  




In this study, we examine the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and the 
management. Several past researchers have found conflicting incentives between the two parties. 
While shareholders usually seek maximization of shareholder value, the management may be more 
interested in managing a larger company, be higher compensated or take other actions that 
improves power and prestige. To reveal if such behaviour is in fact influencing acquisition 
performance, we study how acquisition performance by Nordic companies varies with ownership 
concentration and cash holdings. We have chosen to explicitly include the company’s cash 
holdings (see section 4.2 for a definition) in our study to cultivate the agency cost issue as we 
hypothesize, based on past research, that management with access to large amounts of cash will 
be more inclined to engage in self-interested actions and thus inflict agency costs.  
The effect of excess cash reserves and shareholder concentration have been examined separately 
in the past and yielded inconsistent results. There are, according to past studies, both benefits and 
costs associated with holding excess cash reserves. The benefits highlighted by researchers is 
usually the financial flexibility to pursue profitable investment opportunities as they present 
themselves in addition to freedom from expensive external financing (Huang, Elkinawy & Jain, 
2013; Oler & Waegelein 2011). The costs are mainly related to agency cost theory, where high 
cash reserves give the management opportunity to pursue value-destroying investments due to self-
interested motives such as higher compensations or empire building (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). One way to restrain managers from this behaviour is to actively monitor 
their actions to ensure value-enhancing acquisitions. Thus, access to large amounts of ready cash 
have both potential benefits and costs which makes it an interesting variable to include in relation 
to the principal-agency theory. Moreover, it seems like the best way to exploit the benefits, while 
reducing the harm of excess cash reserves, is by having a large owner that actively monitors the 
management.  
Accordingly, researchers such as Holderness and Sheehan (1988) have examined how ownership 
concentration affect firm performance and investment decisions. The theory is that a dispersed 
ownership concentration leads to weakly controlled managers, which in turn pursue projects and 
acquisitions that is in their own interest at the expense of the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The reasoning is that when no single shareholder has a large 




enough stake in the company, no one has incentive to bear the costs of monitoring, and thus agency 
costs arise. When the firm has a high ownership concentration, meaning a large shareholder who 
has incentives to actively monitor the management, some researchers have found evidence of 
increased firm performance. Most of the past literature points in this direction, and thus we develop 
the hypothesis that an increase in ownership concentration is associated with an increase in bidder 
performance. However, as Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2005) have shown, there are costs to 
monitoring which might exceed the benefits.   
In addition, with high ownership concentration another conflict of interest may arise. Johnson, La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer (2000) pointed to the principal-principal relationship which is 
the relationship between majority and minority shareholders. They found evidence of decreased 
firm performance due to large controlling shareholders extracting corporate resources or other 
value-decreasing behaviour at the expense of the minority. Thus, we have reasons to believe that 
there might exist a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. 
We think this is an interesting phenomenon to investigate, and thus we have developed a third 
hypothesis to test if there is a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. More specifically, we investigate if firms with a controlling majority shareholder 
(≥50 % ownership stake) perform better or worse compared to firms without a controlling majority 
shareholder.   
There are to our knowledge no studies that examines the interaction between excess cash holdings 
and ownership concentration on acquisition performance. Additionally, we examine the more 
recent principal-principal cost theory which has not been as thoroughly researched as the principal-
agent theory. We perform our investigation by analysing a data sample of 1,083 Nordic 
transactions by 439 unique bidders from 2011-2020. The average ownership fraction of the largest 
shareholder in our sample is 28.4 % while the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is 2.9 
% with a median of 1.7 %. We have also controlled for various variables and fixed effects, which 
we will further elaborate on in our data and methodology section (sections 4 and 5). 
Our data shows clear evidence of a positive correlation between abnormal return in takeovers and 
ownership concentration. The models we propose predicts that bidders with a strong owner will 




gain additional abnormal return relative bidders with dispersed ownership of roughly 1.2 %. 
Moreover, we find evidence that bidders with strong owners are better at leveraging the benefits 
of accumulating excess cash. However, when the strongest owner gains complete control of the 
bidder they are no better than a bidder with dispersed ownership at utilizing the benefits of excess 
cash. This, in and of itself, is evidence of principal-principal costs. However, it is also the only 
evidence of principal-principal costs we find in our data.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present previous literature and theory 
of firm performance and investment decisions by firms with excess cash reserves and ownership 
structure separately. We then introduce our hypotheses in section 3, methodology in section 4 and 
data sample in section 5 which we use to measure the performance of acquisitions. In section 6 we 
provide descriptive statistics for our sample. In section 7 we discuss and highlight our findings 
based on our empirical evidence. Finally, we shortly discuss robustness in section 8, weakness in 
section 9, before we conclude the thesis in section 10.  
  




2  Literature review 
In this section we present relevant findings from past literature regarding ownership concentration 
and excess cash reserves with respect to firm performance and investments. Our findings here lay 
the foundation for how we approach our data sample in addition to our interpretation of the 
regression results presented in section 7. We aim to present the reader with consensus of past 
research while also presenting studies with differing results. Hopefully, we succeed in providing a 
general overview of past findings and to equip the reader with sufficient knowledge to follow our 
reasoning later when we discuss our results.  
2.1  Principal-agency theory 
In general, corporate governance refers to the way in which a company is governed and to what 
purpose. In modern, public corporations there is a separation of control and ownership where 
shareholders delegate decision-making authority to the management (Berle, 1932). This is 
formally known as a principal-agent relationship.   
Jensen & Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as: “a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (p.5). If the agent 
maximizes their own utility, the agent may not always act according to the best interest of the 
principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Consequently, agency costs arise.  
One way to reduce agency costs is to monitor the management’s actions. Tirole (2006) defines it 
as interfering with management to obstruct value destroying actions. When shareholders actively 
monitor their management, they gather information and intervene on value destroying decisions 
(Tirole, 2006). However, there are costs to monitoring and it is therefore not always clear if 
monitoring is value-enhancing.  




2.2  Ownership concentration 
Firms with a high level of concentrated ownership have shareholders with incentives to actively 
monitor the management due to substantial rights to cash flows and control rights (Schleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Urban, 2015). The cash flow rights will potentially make the costs of monitoring 
worthwhile, and the control rights gives them power to influence the decision-making of the 
management. In these cases, it is more likely to be in the best interest of the shareholders to actively 
monitor the management. Active monitoring will reduce opportunistic behaviour of the 
management as the probability of getting detected increases (Urban, 2015).   
One potential cost of active monitoring may be lack of initiative or incentive to gather information 
by the management (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). The argument is that when management have less 
autonomy, they will put in less effort if they believe that shareholders will interfere in their 
decision-making. Thus, potential profitable investment opportunities, such as acquisitions, may be 
lost (Burkart, Gromb & Panunzi, 1997). Additionally, it is costly for shareholders to spend their 
time on gathering information to monitor the management.  
Maher and Andersson (2000) observed that monitoring in companies with dispersed ownership 
concentration were weak. As any shareholder that monitor will bear the full costs of monitoring, 
and the benefits are low, they have incentives to free-ride and hope other shareholders will take 
the cost (Maher and Andersson, 2000). In addition, no single shareholder has any real influence 
on the management which further misaligns their incentive to actively monitor (Demsetz, 1983). 
Companies with low ownership concentration will thus have fewer control mechanisms in place 
and are more likely to engage in value-decreasing acquisitions or other investments (Harford, 
1997). However, as there are costs to monitoring, the net effect is not necessarily negative for firm 
performance.   
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found that investment decisions, number of mergers and 
acquisitions, and rates of returns are similar for firms with dispersed and concentrated ownerships. 
However, they did find evidence of differences in the identity of large shareholders between 
individuals and corporations (Holderness & Sheehan, 1988). Paletta and Alimehmeti (2012) saw 




a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm value in a study of Italian firms. 
Their evidence gave support to the theory that higher concentration increases shareholder power 
and control which aligns managers and shareholder’s interests, and consequently increase firm 
value. Caprio et al. (2011) found that an increase in voting rights of the largest shareholder indeed 
reduced the probability of a firm undertaking acquisitions. 
Contrary to Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Kim and Jung (2019) found that higher ownership 
concentration reduced the likelihood of become an acquirer. Interestingly, they also found that 
higher ownership concentration combined with an all-cash offer leads to more negative reactions. 
According to Kim and Jung (2019), a potential reason for this result was that owners who value 
control pay in cash instead of stock to maintain control regardless of value and the financial 
position of the firm. This is a result of majority-minority conflict, and the market thus reacts 
negative when a firm with large controlling shareholder acquire firms with an all-cash offer, all 
else equal (Kim & Jung, 2019).  
2.2.1  Principal-principal costs 
Additionally, Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer (2000) and Shleifer & Vishny 
(1997) found evidence of conflicts of interests between majority and minority shareholders which 
can have a negative effect on firm performance. When large enough, controlling shareholders have 
the power to extract benefits and corporate resources for personal use at the expense of the minority 
(Johnson et al., 2000; Bebchuck, 1999). This reasoning has led researchers to argue that there is a 
non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm value.  The relationship 
between a large controlling shareholder and negative firm performance was also supported by 
Anwar (2020) in a study of firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, and by Yun, Ahmad, Jebran 
and Muhammad (2020) in a study of Chinese companies. 
Other potential costs of concentrated ownership that might arise and thus reduce firm value are 
reduced market liquidity (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993), low diversification benefits (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985), and lower management initiative (Burkart et al., 1997).    




2.3  Excess cash 
The literature on cash holdings and firm performance is inconclusive as researchers have found 
evidence of both positive and negative effect on firm performance. Jensen’s (1986) predicted that 
cash-rich firms would make systematically worse investment decisions, as they are not restrained 
by external capital markets. Both Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) have underlined the 
importance of forcing managers to frequently return to external capital markets as the financing 
process monitors the behaviour of the management. However, as we have previously shown, the 
monitoring can be performed by other stakeholders such as the shareholders. When the 
shareholders actively monitor the management, some studies have found it optimal to generate 
internal funds to reduce transaction costs (Huang et al., 2013; Oler & Waegelein, 2011). However, 
there are costs to monitoring which might exceed the benefits.  
Prior to the free cash flow theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) tried to describe the behaviour of 
self-interested managers. They developed the spending hypothesis which implies that self-
interested managers will prefer expansion of the firm and spend excess cash flow when generated. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), these managers will prefer to spend generated cash in 
the present, foregoing future investment opportunities with higher net present value (NPV). 
Harford, Mansi & Maxwell (2006) gave support to this hypothesis when they found that high-level 
cash firms with weak governance will spend cash more quickly. In other words, self-interested 
managers will act in their own self-interest when the opportunity presents itself. Thus, it seems 
like firms with high levels of cash require stronger governance to restrict self-interested managers 
from pursuing value-destroying investments.  
Harford (1997) supported Jensen’s free cash flow theory and hypothesized that managers who are 
given freedom from external capital markets puts less effort in research, and thus makes more 
mistakes. His findings showed that the abnormal stock return at acquisition announcement is 
negatively correlated with a firm’s deviation of predicted optimal cash reserves. Later, La Rocca 
and Cambrea (2019) found evidence of decreased firm performance of companies with greater 
liquid assets due to agency costs and inefficient use of resources.  




A similar, but different, hypothesis is the hubris hypothesis of takeovers. This hypothesis implies 
that managers seek to acquire firms due to hubris or overconfidence, sometimes at the expense of 
shareholders (Roll, 1986). Hubris is the pride of the managers in the acquiring firm measured by 
various forms of variables. CEO hubris have been found to be positively associated with the size 
of premiums paid (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Furthermore, overconfident CEOs have been 
found to do more acquisitions and these acquisitions are more likely to be low-quality and value-
destroying (Malmendier & Tate, 2008). In addition, overconfident and hubris-filled CEOs have 
been found to execute deals more rapidly and at a higher frequency (Aktas, de Bodt, & Roll, 2008). 
Consequently, the need for monitoring is greater when a firm is run by an influential CEO.    
Moreover, Bliss and Rosen (2001) and Harford and Li (2007) showed that CEO compensation 
increases after acquisitions, which might also lead weakly controlled managers to frequently 
initiate acquisitions to increase compensations.  However, Khorana and Zenner (1998) found that 
good acquisitions increased compensation, while bad acquisitions reduced them. 
On the other hand, Huang et al. (2013), and Oler and Waegelein (2011) found that holding greater 
liquid assets improves the financial flexibility of the firm and thus improves firm performance. 
They claim that, in a dynamic business environment, managers prefer financial flexibility to be 
able to invest in growth opportunities as they present themselves. However, for mature firms with 
few good growth opportunities, we hypothesize that a cash pay-out in the form of dividends might 
make the shareholders better off.  
Some researchers have argued that firms stockpile cash to actively avoid the extra costs of external 
capital markets that arise from frictions such as asymmetric information (Myers, 1984). This is 
known as the pecking order theory. The pecking order theory states that when firms undertake 
investments, they prefer to use internally generated funds, then safe and risky debt, and last equity 
to minimize transaction costs. Froot, Scharfstein & Stein (1993) argue that asymmetric information 
makes internal financing less costly than external financing. This implies that some firms are cash-
rich because they plan to undertake investments and believe that it is optimal to internally generate 
the cash from its operations. If this is a rational thought held by many managers, then we would 
expect increased abnormal stock returns by firm with excess cash holdings.  




Furthermore, Pinkowitz, Sturgess & Williamson (2011) studied US firms with excess cash 
reserves and did find evidence of timing behaviour by managers of US firms. Their findings 
implied that managers time the market and use cash only when stocks are undervalued or relatively 
undervalued, even if they are cash rich. In other words, managers use the cheapest source of capital, 
and they claim that their findings mitigate the concern that stockpiles of cash leads to 
overinvestment in acquisitions. Additionally, Nguyen (2016) did not find evidence of excess cash 
reserves and initiation of value-decreasing investments although he did find evidence of increased 
probability of becoming a bidder.  
  




3  Hypothesis Development 
Hopefully, we have succeeded in highlighting the inconsistent evidence of past literature on 
ownership concentration and excess cash reserves with respect to firm performance. However, it 
does seem like consensus is favouring the presence of a large, active owner. Accordingly, we 
develop our first hypothesis which is that the presence of a large owner affects acquisition 
performance positively. However, as this thesis is to some extent based on Anwar’s (2020) thesis 
which concluded with the opposite, namely that the presence of a large owner is negatively 
correlated with acquisition performance, we have decided to two-way test the hypothesis. 
Consequently, we introduce the following null and alternative: 
H10: the presence of a large/strong owner does not affect acquisition performance 
H1A: the presence of a large/strong owner affects acquisition performance 
Moreover, the literature is presenting us with potential benefits and costs of having excess cash 
reserves with respect to firm and bidder performance. Our interpretation is that bidders have a 
greater chance of being protected from the negative side effects of accumulating cash, as they 
avoid agency costs when they have a large owner that actively monitors the management.  
Consequently, the firm should also be in a better position to reap the benefits: financial flexibility 
and freedom from expensive external financing. However, due to the ambiguity regarding cash 
accumulation in the literature we will test the following two-way null and alternative hypothesis: 
H20: the presence of a large/strong owner does not affect how well bidders manage excess cash 
reserves  
H2A: the presence of a large/strong owner affects how well bidders manage excess cash reserves  
Finally, we also want to research costs associated with principal-principal issues as some 
researchers have claimed to find evidence of. The theory is that the presence of a controlling 
majority shareholder is less than optimal as they have power to benefit themselves at the expense 




of other shareholders. Accordingly, we hypothesize that bidders with a large owner (<50 %, but 
still high enough for monitoring to be profitable) performs better in acquisitions than bidders with 
a controlling shareholder (≥50 %). As such, we believe that it is optimal to have a large owner that 
actively monitors the management while also depending on the voting rights of other shareholders. 
Thus, we test the following one-way null and alternative hypothesis: 
H30: bidders with a large/strong owner perform equally good, or worse, as bidders with a 
controlling shareholder 
H3A: bidders with a large/strong owner outperforms bidders with a controlling shareholder 
  




4  Methodology 
We use announcement returns as the dependent variable to analyze the effects of bidders with 
concentrated ownership and excess cash on acquisition performance. In this section we will cover 
the methodology used to estimate the announcement returns and excess cash of the bidders, as well 
as the control variables used in the analysis. 
4.1  The dependent variable: Bidder announcement return 
The most common event study methodology utilizes the market model (CAPM) to estimate 
abnormal returns in for the event. However, we have opted for the market adjusted return 
methodology, which does not require us to estimate market model OLS parameters. This 
methodology it is viewed as simpler, as it does not require two steps: one estimation period step, 
and one event window calculation step.  
Brown and Warner (1980) argue that the market adjusted return methodology have no less power 
in inference relative to the CAPM-model when using daily data with a short event window. By 
simulation, Brown and Warner (1985) showed that when abnormal return was present, the CAPM 
model was equally likely as the market adjusted return model to infer correctly. Binder (1998) 
argues that this is likely due to estimation error in the market model parameters (α and β), which 
he argues off-sets greater precision due to risk adjustments. An important assumption for these 
results is that the events are not clustered in calendar time. This assumption holds for our sample, 
see section 5.1 for further details on our sample. Consequently, we argue that the market adjusted 
return model is sufficiently accurate, compared to the standard event study methodology, for our 
purposes. 
As such, the abnormal return for bidder 𝑖 at time 𝑡 is:  
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 




Where, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the abnormal return and actual return, respectively, for bidder 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return of the MCSI World benchmark index at time 𝑡. 
For the dependent variable not to be contaminated by other, and, for our purposes, exogenous 
events/news, we apply a short event window. This is also required for Brown and Warner’s (1980) 
conclusions to hold. Additionally, in a short event window, a given bidder’s unsystematic risk is 
arguably less likely to have major influence in the performance of the security. As such, a short 
event window is more likely to yield inferable results given our choice of methodology.  
Resultingly, we use an event window of [-1, +1] that is from one day prior to one day after the 
date of announcement. This window is short enough for the assumptions of the model to hold 
(Brown and Warner, 1980), and by adding the day after announcement the model gives the market 
an additional day to react to the takeover news. Thus, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to 
bidder 𝑖, for any given takeover announcement in our sample, is equal to: 




4.2  Bidder cash model – Cash holding deviation 
Harford (1999) concluded that cash-rich bidders (according to his model) are more likely to engage 
in takeover activity, have significant negative stock price reaction to the announcement, and 
display subsequent poor operating performance after the takeover. However, both Huang et al. 
(2013) and Oler and Waegelein (2011) found that more cash and cash equivalent holdings 
increases financial flexibility, and as such improved firm performance.   
To test H2, we examine if, and how, excess cash holdings affect acquisition performance. Hence, 
an important question is how we define and determine excess cash of the bidders in our sample. 
For our purposes, Harford’s (1999) cash model is too restrictive as it requires future (actual) cash 
flow from operations for the two years post acquisition. Implementing Harford’s model would thus 




exclude observations post-2017. Combining this with restrictions in the other end of the timeframe 
(see section 5.2) would yield an unfortunately small sample.  
In more applicable example in the literature, Eckbo, Makaew and Thorburn (2018) modelled 
Target cash holdings with the following OLS-model, based on Harford et al. (2009): 




 𝛽4 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅&𝐷 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽6 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1  
Where for bidder 𝑖 at year-end prior to announcement (𝑡 − 1), Cash holding is cash divided by 
total assets, Size is the natural log of total assets, M/B is the market-to-book ratio, R&D is research 
and development expense divided by total assets, and Missing R&D Dummy is equal to 1 if R&D 
is missing. Operating Efficiency for bidder 𝑖 at 𝑡 − 1 is calculated by the following formula: 
 
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑆𝐺𝐴 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑃𝐸 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
 
Excess cash, or cash richness if you like, is accordingly measured by the deviation of the bidder’s 
actual Cash holding and the model’s predicted Cash holding for that bidder-year pair. In other 
words, the residual of the Cash holding model, hereafter called Cash holding deviation.  
4.3  Ownership concentration 
The common practice in the literature is to measure ownership concentration as either the 
ownership fraction of the largest shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999; Iannotta, Nocera & Sironi, 
2007), or the aggregate ownership fraction of the three largest shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998). 
We define ownership concentration as the former, due to limitations in the ownership data structure 
(see section 5.2 for further details). Furthermore, considering only the largest owner allow us to 
examine effects regarding the type of owner of the largest shareholder, which we implement as a 
secondary hypothesis in this thesis.  




Owning 20 % of the votes in a company is according to La Porta et al. (1999) sufficient to have 
effective control of a firm. The argument is that a proportion of the shareholders are passive in that 
they do not execute their voting rights. If, for instance, 40 % of the ownership is passive then: 
(100 % − 40 %) ∗ 50 % = 30 % is sufficient for wielding effective control.  
Moreover, our impression is that most studies focus geographically on the U.S. and/or U.K., 
whereas we study the Nordics. According to a report by the OECD (2017), the Nordics are more 
concentrated than the U.S. and the U.K., especially so for Norwegian companies. The sample of 
comparable studies will, relative to our sample, have a bias toward lower ownership concentration. 
Therefore, we argue that this paper should have a slightly stricter definition of ownership 
concentration compared to La Porta et al. (1999). 
Resultingly, we define a concentrated ownership structure as binary variable which is equal to 1 if 
one entity holds at least 30 % of the shares in a company/bidder, 0 otherwise. This definition is 
applied to test hypotheses H1 and H2, and hereafter the variable definition is referred to as Large 
owner.  
To test H3 (principal-principal issues) we apply a secondary definition where we split the Large 
owner variable to two variables. Large minority is defined as a binary variable which is equal to 
1 if one entity holds 30-50 % of the shares in company/bidder, 0 otherwise. Controlling majority 
is defined as a binary variable which is equal to 1 if one entity holds 50 % or more of the shares 
in a company/bidder, 0 otherwise.  
4.4  Control variables:  
Below we will shorty introduce the control variables we use to study the effect of the variables of 
interest. 




4.4.1  Type of owner  
Governmental participance in the capital markets is more common in the Nordics compared to 
other OECD countries. Furthermore, it is possible that bidders controlled by governmental entities 
have other priorities than pure profit maximization. Some actions preferred by a government may 
not be preferred by non-governmental entities. In addition, governmental entities may in some 
instances not execute their voting rights in order to segregate politics from an otherwise free capital 
market. If these two assumptions are correct, then what type of owner the largest shareholder is 
could affect the acquisition performance (CAR). Consequently, we find it necessary to include type 
of owner as a control variable.   
The type of owner-variable is defined as the owner type of the largest shareholder. We categorize 
ownership into three types: Governmental, Bank and Other. Hereafter, this variable is referred to 
as Owner type. 
4.4.2  Size 
In an empirical study, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) find that size is negatively 
correlated with bidder returns. Their results are in fact so strong that the effects are present 
irrespective of the form of financing and whether the acquiring firm is public or private (Moeller 
et al., 2004). In level terms their study concludes that small acquirors generate roughly two 
percentage points higher returns for takeovers (Moeller et al., 2004).  An economic rationale is 
that large firms has more buying power and consequently offer higher premiums (Moeller et al., 
2004). Since their findings seem so robust also for public acquirors, we include size as a control 
variable, calculated as the natural log of the previous year-end total assets. Hereafter, this variable 
is referred to as Size.  
4.4.3  Relative size 
The return of a given acquisition has greater influence on the bidder’s equity value (in other words 
our dependent variable) if the target is of equal size as the bidder (Asquith, Bruner & Mullins Jr, 
1983). For example, if a takeover yields 10 % return over the target’s equity and the bidder is of 




equal size, then the abnormal return to the bidder will be 10 %. However, if the bidder is much 
larger, then the abnormal return will be linearly smaller (Asquith et al., 1983). This simple example 
illustrates the effect of relative size on bidder takeover returns which is empirically supported by 
the data (Asquith et al., 1983). Furthermore, Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) back the findings, but add 
that the conclusions are less evident – although still significant – after the 60s.   
As a result of the abovementioned empirical findings, relative size is often included as a control 
variable in M&A event studies. Our sampling does not require targets to be publicly listed, as such 
we use deal value as a proxy for target size. Thus, Relative size is equal to the deal value divided 
by the previous year-end market capitalization of the bidder.  
4.4.4  Method of payment 
Deal payment method is generally included as a control variable in acquisition event studies as it 
can influence bidder return. For instance, any cash payment to the target will impose an immediate 
tax liability on the target shareholders, hence they will seek compensation in the form of higher 
premiums (Datta, Pinches & Narayanan, 1992). Moreover, a share payment will usually take 
longer to execute, which increases transaction costs (Datta et al., 1992). This argument is further 
supported by Travlos’ (1987) empirical evidence that full stock compensation induces negative 
abnormal stock price reaction. Paying with stock also has a negative signaling effect. The rationale 
is that the management is best suited to know whether the stock is under- or overvalued and will 
use stock when their share is overvalued, and cash otherwise.    
In our sample, method of payment has four levels: Cash, Shares, Mixed and Unknown. The 
variable is hereafter referred to as Deal payment type.  
4.4.5  Related acquisition 
In an unrelated acquisition the bidder enters an entirely new industry that lacks similarities with 
existing operations. Synergy gains tend to be higher for related industry mergers than unrelated 
mergers, and thus the likelihood of overpayment is lower (Chang, 1998). Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990) argues that managers are undiversified, and as such, diversifying the business they 




run is in their best interest. Moreover, unrelated acquisitions increase the survival rate of the firm 
the manager is in control of (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). Lastly, the managers might have 
better fortunes in a new industry (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990).  
Consequently, we include related acquisitions as a control (dummy) variable. The dummy is equal 
to 1 if the bidder and target have identical four-digit SIC codes, 0 otherwise. Hereafter, the variable 
is referred to as Related.  
  




5  Data 
We have gathered the data for our sample from several different sources. In this section we will 
describe the data sources and provide some descriptive analysis for our variables.  
5.1  M&A data 
The M&A data in our sample is gathered from the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) M&A database, Orbis. 
Below we describe the criteria of our M&A data sampling: 
(1) Deal Type: Acquisition. In the Orbis database, an acquisition is defined as any takeover in 
which the bidder’s final stake in the target is greater or equal to 50 %. Additionally, we require the 
initial stake to be below 50 %, however, this is criterion is executed at a later stage.  
(2) Deal status: Announced, Completed – Confirmed, Completed – Assumed. This criterion is a 
direct consequence of our hypothesis. We want to study announcement results, therefore other deal 
statuses such as “rumored” will not hold as is not as concrete as a formal announcement from the 
top management.  
(3) Announcement date period: 01/01/2011 – 31/12/2020. This filter is a result of the limitations 
in the BvD ownership database, Zephyr. The size of Zephyr’s database was, arguably, limited prior 
to 2010. In 2009, the ownership data base had 28.1 million links, while in 2019 it contained nearly 
200 million links (Bureau van Dijk, 2019). During data collection we noticed observations from 
2010 in the ownership data base which were outright wrong. To ease concerns regarding false data 
we limit the sample accordingly, by not using ownership data prior to 2010. The ownership data 
is lagged one year relative to the M&A data, which is why, although we include ownership data 
from 2010, the M&A data starts at 2011.  
(4) Country: Nordic states. Our hypothesis is a direct consequence of Anwar’s (2020) thesis. His 
sample considered Norwegian deals only. However, since our methodology and hypotheses 
require financial data as well, which further diminish the sample due to missing data, we include 




all Nordic countries. We are comfortable in generalizing Anwar’s findings to other Nordic 
countries as they are quite similar in terms of governmental participation, GDP etc. (Høgenhaven, 
Averio & Werngren, 2012) 
(5) Deal value (USD): all deals with known deal value (incl. estimates). Deal value is an important 
control variable in our analysis (see section 4.4.3). Note that this criterion filters away many 
observations, indicating that Orbis requires high data quality in this variable. 
Imposing the abovementioned criteria on the M&A-data yield an initial sample of 3.082 deals. 
However, further data requirements decrease the number of observations in the final sample.   
5.2  Ownership Data  
To test our hypothesis, we need to gather data on the owner type and ownership fraction of the 
largest shareholder, for all acquirers in our sample. To obtain the ownership data we executed a 
company search in Zephyr (BvD’s ownership database) for all the unique bidders in our initial 
sample. The intention is to export the ownership data for each company each year in our sample, 
which we subsequently lag 1 year relative to the M&A data.  
Zephyr requires two pieces of information for the ownership fraction variable. (1) How many 
shareholders you want to include, and (2) a MM/YYYY date. Regarding the former, we chose the 
smallest available option – the top five shareholders – as we only need to know the ownership 
fraction of the largest shareholder. The latter requirement unfortunately introduced some 
immediate issues. Let us illustrate the issue with an example.  
Below is an example of how Zephyr collects and stores information on the top five shareholders 
for Equinor in 2020. In the rightmost column we see the ownership fraction and data collection 
month for each shareholder. For three of the five shareholders Zephyr collected the information at 
06/2020. However, for the final two the shareholder information is collected at other dates – 
09/2020 and 10/2020.  




Table 5.2.1: Zephyr’s data collection method, real data example for Equinor in 2020 
Shareholder name Country Data collection date Ownership % 
Norway NO 06/2020 67.00% 
Norway via its funds NO 10/2020 3.96% 
Folketrygdfondet NO 06/2020 3.00% 
Fidelity Mngt & Research US 06/2020 1.50% 
FMR LLC via its funds US 09/2020 1.47% 
 
Thus, if we ask Zephyr for the ownership fraction of the top five shareholders for 12/2020 (year-
end 2020), then the variable will not display either of the values in the table above as neither are 
collected at 12/2020. Put in other words, Orbis does not have a year-end ownership variable, only 
data collection date variables.  
To solve this issue, we added one ownership variable for each month of each year. Given that there 
are 10 years (2011-2020) in our sample we end up with 120 ownership variables to export. 
Subsequently, we find each shareholder’s maximum ownership fraction throughout each year. The 
largest shareholder is finally determined by which shareholder held the largest position in any 
given year. The data on that shareholder’s owner type and ownership fraction is thus our ownership 
data variables.   
Our way of handling this issue allows us to move towards a useful sample, however, it also 
introduces weakness. In a worst-case scenario, the recorded values on owner type and ownership 
fraction could be dated almost two years prior to the announcement, during which time the 
ownership fraction could change significantly. However, we argue that investors holding at least 
30% of the shares in a company usually have a long-term perspective. Thus, we assume that 
significant changes occur in only a few cases. 
Lastly, we added the bidders’ BvD ID number and ISIN to the exports in order to connect the 
ownership data with the M&A sample and financial data (Compustat), respectively. 




5.3  Financial data – acquiror firm characteristics  
Moreover, our hypothesis/testing strategy require some financial data. More specifically, the cash 
holding model (section 4.2) require variables which are unavailable in the Orbis data space. 
Consequently, we export all relevant financial data (sections 4.2, 4.4.2 and 4.4.3) from Compustat 
using each bidder’s international security identification number (ISIN) and the deal’s year to link 
the two sources. Moreover, the M&A database in Orbis does not have share price data on dates 
surrounding announcement. Consequently, we import the stock data for all bidders in our sample 
from CRSP.   
We import currency-exchange (FX/USD) timeseries to remove unwanted currency effects. All 
currencies are exchanged from their respective local currency to USD. The source for each 
exchange rate is the Federal Reserve Bank, Foreign Exchange Rates, obtained from WRDS data 
services.  
Finally, we add market returns to enable us to calculate abnormal returns. We use the MSCI World 
index as our benchmark rather than one local benchmark for each country. We argue that the MSCI 
World better reflect the fact that capital markets today are so globalized that the marginal investor 
invests in the global space. We collect historical data on the MSCI World index from Datastream. 
For each data source, some of the bidders’ ISIN is unknown. However, to connect all the 
information together, we require every data source to know every bidder’s ISIN. Consequently, 
the import of the financial data reduces our sample to 1,954 acquisitions.  
There are still missing information for some of the financial data variables used to calculate cash 
holding deviation. That, in addition to eliminating some weird observations; zero shares 
outstanding, ownership fractions of more than 99 %, and toeholds of greater or equal to 50 %, 
further dimmish the sample. Lastly, we eliminate two observations where CAR [-1, +1] is more 
than 100 %. The final sample contains 1,083 acquisitions.  




6  Descriptive summary 
Table 6.1 presents some descriptive information about the sample. The final sample consists of 
1,083 acquisitions by 439 unique bidders in total. Note that the owner type variable has 87 missing 
observations. The average ownership fraction of the largest shareholder is 28.4 %. The average 
CAR during our specified event window, one day before to one day after announcement, is 2.9 % 
while the median is 1.7 %. Thus, the distribution of our dependent variable has a fat left tail and a 
long right tail.  
Table 6.1: Introductory key sample statistics                         
 All acquisitions    1,083 
 Unique bidders    439 
 Average ownership fraction of largest shareholder    28.4% 
 Average CAR[-1, +1]       2.9% 
 Median CAR[-1, +1]             1.7% 
 
Figure 6.2 presents the deal activity by number of deals (line) and aggregate deal value (bars) for 
each year in our sample.  
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From 2012 through 2015 the number of deals in our sample are stable at around 90. However, the 
aggregate deal value more than doubles during the same period. After 2015, the number of deals 
increases to 161 deals in 2017. Interestingly, the aggregate deal value in 2017 is lower than both 
the year prior and after, although the number of deals is higher. Finally, in 2020 we see that both 
the number of deals and aggregate deal value heavily declines. This is likely a result of Orbis still 
working on collecting information on the deals executed in 2020. 
Table 6.3 presents statistics of all relevant variables grouped by the different definitions of 
ownership concentration used in the analysis (see section 4.3 for further details). Recall that we 
use three different definitions of the ownership concentration. Large owner is equal to 1 if one 
shareholder holds at least 30 % of the shares outstanding, 0 otherwise. Large minority is equal to 
1 if one shareholder holds 30-50 % of the shares outstanding, 0 otherwise. Controlling majority is 
equal to 1 if one shareholder holds at least 50 % of the shares outstanding, 0 otherwise. As such, 
Large owner is the least strict definition of ownership concentration, while Controlling majority 
is the strictest.  
Panel A gives insight to the sample distribution of Owner types given the different definitions of 
ownership concentration. Other is the most and Bank the least frequent owner type in our sample. 
Furthermore, we observe that Governmental is the only Owner type where there are more 
observations categorized as a Large owner (33), than not (23 [from: 56 – 33]). Finally, we note 
that the owner type variable is the only source of missing observations, 87 in total relative to the 
rest of the sample.  
Panel B lists the average and median Cash holding deviation (in percentage points) for all 
definitions of ownership concentration (see section 4.2 for further details regarding the 
methodology of the Cash holding deviation variable). The average Cash holding deviation in the 
sample is, as a consequence of the Cash holding deviation methodology, 0 %.  However, for Large 
owner bidders, the average Cash holding deviation is positive (0.28 %). The median Cash holding 
deviation is negative in the total sample (-0.73 %) and for Large owners (-0.41 %). This indicates 
that the sample distribution of Cash holding deviation has a fat left tail, and a long right tail.  





Table 6.3 Overview of deal characteristics by our definitions of ownership concentration 
Panel A: Owner type, sample distribution (note: 87 missing observations) 
 
Ownership concentration 
(Ownership fraction)  










   N %  N %   N %   N % 
  Governmental   33 8%   14 6%  19 12%  56 6% 
 Bank  11 3%  8 4%  3 2%  90 9% 
 Other  347 89%  204 90%  143 87%  850 85% 
 Total  391 100%  226 100%  165 100%  996 100%               
Panel B: Cash holding deviation (in percentage points) 
 Average  0.28%  0.41%  0.08%  0.00% 
 Median  -0.41%  -0.13%  -0.59%  -0.73%               
Panel C: Bidder and deal characteristics (USD Million)  
 Average market cap.  7,754.4  4,501.3  12,539.6  4,482.5 
 Average total assets  7,451.1  4,990.1  11,071.0  4,617.6 
 Median total assets  703.4  1,243.8  463.9  268.8 
 Average deal value  159.9  131.9  201.0  150.7 
 Median deal value  17.1  16.0  18.0  12.9 
 Average relative size  25.6%  24.5%  27.3%  34.2%               
Panel D: Bidder country, sample distribution  
 Norway  82 19%  43 17%  39 23%  167 23% 
 Sweden  247 58%  165 65%  82 48%  646 48% 
 Denmark  38 9%  7 3%  31 18%  93 18% 
 Finland  58 14%  38 15%  20 12%  177 12% 
 Total  425 100%  253 100%  172 100%  1,083 100%               
Panel E: Deal payment type, sample distribution 
 Cash  137 32%  84 33%  53 31%  308 28% 
 Shares  26 6%  14 6%  12 7%  85 8% 
 Mixed  166 39%  95 38%  71 41%  463 43% 
 Unknown  96 23%  60 24%  36 21%  227 21%               
Panel F: Related/unrelated, sample distribution 
 Related  131 31%  75 30%  56 33%  319 29% 
  Unrelated   294 69%   178 70%   116 67%   764 71% 
  




Panel C presents key bidder and deal characteristics. The average market capitalization for a Large 
Owner is USD 7,754.4 million, while for a Controlling majority the average market capitalization 
is USD 12,539.6 million. Thus, average market capitalization increase as the definition of 
ownership concentration gets stricter (i.e. higher share required to be classified as concentrated 
ownership). The same pattern is present for average total assets.  
Median total assets are lower for a Controlling majority (USD 463.9 million) compared to a Large 
owner (USD 703.4 million). This tells us two things: (1) the sample distribution of bidder size has 
a fat left tail and long right tail, and (2) this characteristic is exaggerated as the definition of 
ownership concentration gets stricter.  
The average deal value for a Large owner is USD 159.9 million, while Controlling majority has 
an average deal value of USD 201.0 million.  
The average relative deal size is, for all definitions of concentrated ownership, roughly 25 %. 
Interestingly the total sample average relative deal size higher, at 34.2 %. This informs us that 
bidders who are not defined as having concentrated ownership engage in larger acquisitions 
relative to their market capitalization, on average.   
Panel D, E and F present how the remaining control variables are distributed across the different 
specifications of concentrated ownership. By country, half (48 %) of the sample bidders are listed 
in Sweden, while a quarter (23 %) are in Norway, and the remaining bidders in Denmark (18 %) 
and Finland (12 %). Regarding deal payment type, mixed is the most frequent followed by cash, 
for all groupings. Note that the sample contains quite a lot of unknowns in this variable. Finally, 
unrelated acquisitions are far more frequent than related ones, for all groups. The distribution 
between these two levels is approximately equivalent for all groups.  
  




7  Results  
In this section we present four regression tables and seek to explain the results considering past 
literature presented in section 2. Let us recall the hypotheses in this thesis. We wish to test whether 
bidders with a Large owner performs better in acquisitions compared to bidders with dispersed 
ownership (H1). Additionally, we hypothesize that bidders with a Large owner manage excess 
cash reserves better than bidders with dispersed ownership (H2). However, we also hypothesize 
that when a single shareholder gain complete control (Controlling majority) of a bidder, they will 
use their influence/power in their best interest at the expense of minorities. As such, we 
hypothesize that bidders with a Large minority owner preforms better than a bidder with a 
Controlling majority owner (H3).  
We test our hypotheses by analyzing relevant variables in multiple regression models. The first 
three tables we present in this section, Table 7.1, Table 7.2, and Table 7.3, are used to test H1 and 
H2, while Table 7.4 is used to test H3. We will also use the tables to discuss other interesting 
observations, such as observations regarding Owner type, however, we stress that these 
observations are of secondary importance in our thesis.   
  




Table 7.1: Initial model specification proposal. In this table we study the Large owner variable 
and its interaction with Cash holding deviation. The model in column 1 is a pooled OLS 
model. Column 2 has the same model with year dummies (omitted from table). Column 3 is 
an industry fixed effect model, and column 4 is an industry fixed effect model (at the GICS 
industry group level) with year dummies. *, **. *** denote levels of significance at the 10, 5 
and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis.  
 Dependent variable: CAR[-1, +1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cash holding deviation -0.31 (3.69) -0.21 (3.71) -0.50 (3.73) -0.35 (3.75) 
Large owner  0.76 (0.51) 0.81 (0.52) 0.69 (0.53) 0.71 (0.54) 
Cash holding deviation * Large 
owner 
9.65 (6.20) 9.25 (6.22) 10.29 (6.33) 9.77 (6.35) 



















Shares -0.96 (1.04) -0.96 (1.05) -0.59 (1.06) -0.60 (1.07) 
Mixed -0.46 (0.61) -0.52 (0.62) -0.26 (0.62) -0.33 (0.63) 







Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO YES NO YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,083 1,083 1,083 1,083 
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 
  




The main variables of interest in Table 7.1 are Large owner, Cash holding deviation and the 
interaction of the two. According to the results in Table 7.1, neither of the variables are 
significantly different from 0. We cannot conclude that they have an impact on bidder 
performance, and consequently we have no evidence to reject H10 and H20. This result is not too 
surprising as former literature has concluded with both benefits and costs of excess cash reserves 
and high ownership concentration. However, we did expect to see an impact from the interaction 
variable on bidder performance, but the coefficient for the interaction variable is also insignificant.  
The only variables with a significant impact on bidder performance in Table 7.1 are the control 
variables related to bidder size. We observe that Relative size, defined as deal value over bidder’s 
market capitalization, is significant on a 1 % level. However, Relative size is not very economically 
significant as you need a deal value equal to the bidder’s market capitalization to expect a 0.89 % 
increase in abnormal stock returns. Relative size matters because small targets have a smaller 
economic impact on the acquirer by share size (Asquith et al., 1983). Thus, larger relative deals 
tend to increase abnormal stock returns, meaning that larger acquisitions relative to the bidder’s 
current size are more profitable.  
On the other hand, the Size, which is the log of total assets is negative at 1 % level. This suggests 
that larger firms tend to make worse acquisitions. Large, mature firms often make worse 
acquisitions as they pay higher premiums and enter acquisitions with negative dollar synergy gains 
(Schlingemann & Stulz, 2004).   
Lastly, we find no evidence of any association between bidder performance and Deal payment 
method or Related acquisitions.  
  




Table 7.2: Model to determine whether Owner type should be included. The model in column 1 
is a pooled OLS model. Column 2 is an OLS with year dummies (omitted from table). Column 3 
is an industry fixed effect model (at the GICS industry group level), and column 4 is an industry 
fixed effect model with year dummies.   *, **. *** denote levels of significance at the 10, 5 and 
1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 Dependent variable: CAR[-1, +1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank 2.90*** (1.01) 3.05*** (1.02) 3.20*** (1.04) 3.35*** (1.05) 
Governmental -0.04 (1.78) 0.15 (1.78) -0.22 (1.81) -0.10 (1.82) 
Large owner 1.26** (0.59) 1.36** (0.59) 1.14* (0.61) 1.22** (0.62) 
Bank * Large owner -1.11 (2.73) -1.26 (2.76) -1.12 (2.79) -1.31 (2.82) 
Governmental * Large owner -3.45 (2.32) -3.78 (2.34) -4.48* (2.44) -4.77* (2.46) 
Related -0.68 (0.57) -0.76 (0.57) -0.73 (0.59) -0.82 (0.59) 
Relative size 0.90*** (0.16) 0.90*** (0.16) 0.82*** (0.17) 0.82*** (0.17) 
Size -0.29** (0.13) -0.29** (0.13) -0.37*** (0.14) -0.36*** (0.14) 
Shares -1.08 (1.09) -1.09 (1.10) -0.86 (1.12) -0.87 (1.12) 
Mixed -0.36 (0.65) -0.45 (0.67) -0.29 (0.67) -0.41 (0.68) 
Unknown -1.01 (0.75) -1.03 (0.76) -1.10 (0.76) -1.10 (0.77) 
Intercept 3.92*** (1.33) 3.44** (1.60)   
Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO YES NO YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 996 996 996 996 
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 
 
  




The models in Table 7.2 includes Owner type and its interaction with Large owner. The omitted 
dummy from Owner type is Other. As such, Other is the base category by which the other Owner 
types (Bank and Governmental) are compared to. Thus, the Bank and Government coefficients 
denotes the expected difference in abnormal return relative to Other.  Model 1 (2) concludes that 
if the largest shareholder of a bidder is a Bank, we expect 2.90 % (3.05 %) higher abnormal return 
relative to Other, significant at the 5 % level. Moreover, model 1 and 2 concludes that there is no 
statistical difference between Governmental and Other. Thus, model 1 and 2 concludes that, all 
else equal, we can expect higher abnormal returns of acquisitions when the largest owner is a Bank 
rather than Governmental or Other.   
Other is the base/omitted Owner type. Thus, the Large owner coefficient denotes the expected 
incremental gain in abnormal return Other we can expect if the ownership fraction increased to 
Large owner levels, all else equal. The coefficient of the interaction between Large owner and 
Bank (or Government) is the expected difference in abnormal return a Bank (or Government) would 
get if the Bank’s ownership fraction increased to Large owner levels, relative to Other. Thus, the 
net gain in abnormal return of a Bank (or Government) is the sum of the interaction and the Large 
owner coefficients, when the ownership fraction increases to Large owner levels, all else equal. 
In model 1 and 2 in Table 7.2 neither of interaction terms are statistically significant. As such, 
model 1 and 2 predicts that there is no statistical difference of interacting Large owner with the 
three owner type variables with respect to abnormal stock return. In other words, going from a 
scenario where the largest shareholder is not a Large owner to a scenario where the largest 
shareholder is a Large owner has the same effect for all owner types. Thus, bidder performance is 
expected to improve equally regardless of owner type when the largest shareholder is large enough 
to be defined as a Large owner.  
Large owner is associated with 1.26 % and 1.36 % higher bidder return in model 1 and 2 
respectively, both significant at a 5 % level. Since the interactions are insignificant, this is the 
coefficient in play for all Large owner scenarios. Regardless of owner type, model 1 and 2 predicts 
that an acquisition executed by a Large owner can expect higher abnormal returns relative to an 




acquisition where a strong owner is not present. This finding retires the conclusions of the 
regressions in Table 7.1 and speaks in favor of rejecting H10.  
The result is in line with principal-agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). If the firm has a 
dispersed ownership concentration, monitoring the management’s (agent) decision-making 
process is far less likely to be profitable. Since monitoring is a time-consuming activity, every 
shareholder (principal) in the dispersed ownership structure is incentivized to relinquish 
monitoring activity to one of the other shareholders. However, since the ownership concentration 
is dispersed, it is more likely that no one are willing to bear the cost of monitoring, and thus no 
monitoring occurs. Since the management is free of monitoring, they might be more inclined to 
act in their own best interest – as opposed to the shareholders’ interests. As such, the probability 
that the management undertake poor acquisitions increase, and so does the expected abnormal 
stock return.    
However, if ownership is concentrated enough, the largest shareholder will have the appropriate 
incentives to perform monitoring. Although time-consuming and costly, the significant cash flow 
rights may make the monitoring profitable. Thus, our result is in accordance with what we 
expected, namely that a Large owner is correlated with better acquisition performance. This is also 
the main conclusion of the models in regression Table 7.2.  
Based on past literature, return on ownership concentration should in theory only be present when 
a strong owner executes their rights of control to increase shareholder value. Governmental 
entities, in contrast to (most) other owner types, often have other considerations to manage. They 
are not always purely focused on capital gains. For instance, the Norwegian government proclaim 
that economic, social, and environmental sustainability governs their decisions when acting as a 
shareholder (Norwegian Government, 2021)1.  This might explain our observation of a negative 








When we include industry fixed effects, in model 3 (4), the interaction coefficient between 
Governmental and Large owner is -4.48 % (-4.77 %), significant at a 10 % level. As such, the 
fixed effect models concludes that for bidders where the largest shareholder is Governmental, the 
Large owner scenario lowers expected abnormal return by close to 5 %, compared to Owner Type 
Other. Thus, the net effect of increasing the ownership stake of the largest shareholder to be 
defined as a Large owner for a bidder where the largest shareholder is Governmental is –3.34 % 
and –3.55% for model 3 and 4, respectively (βLarge Owner + βOwner Type: Governmental * Large Owner). Although 
the evidence is rather weak, we find this to be an interesting, but not surprising, observation. 
Moreover, the fact that this interaction is significant, although weakly so, in two of the models, 
while Governmental is insignificant in all models could indicate a correlation between the two 
variables. 
In Table 6.3 in the descriptive summary (section 6) we can see that Governmental is the only factor 
in this variable which has more observations where it is a Large owner, than not. Thus, given the 
information that the largest owner is Governmental, it is also more likely than not that the largest 
shareholder is also a Large owner (>30%) as well. This is additional evidence of a correlation 
between Owner type and Large owner.  
Moreover, we observe that the bidder is more likely to perform better if the largest shareholder is 
a bank, all else equal. This effect is significant at a 1 % level in all four models, with a coefficient 
estimate range of 2.9 to 3.4 %. However, the interaction between Bank (Owner type) and Large 
owner is insignificant in all four models. This result allows us to infer that Owner type has a 
significant influence of our dependent variable. 
As Owner type influence the dependent variable (CAR) in addition to probably being correlated 
with Large owner, excluding it from further analysis could introduce omitted bias. Accordingly, 
econometrical theory dictates that (1) we cannot trust inference from Table 7.1, and (2) that Owner 
type must be included in further analysis due to omitted bias.  




Lastly, we observe that Relative size is significantly positive a 1 % level in all models, and Size is 
significantly negative at a 5 % level in model 1 and 2, and significantly negative at a 1 % level in 
industry fixed effects model 3 and 4. These results, regarding sign of the coefficients, are in line 
with past literature. 
  




Table 7.3: Preferred model specification to test H1 and H2. In regression Table 7.3 we study the 
effect of interaction between Large owner and Owner type, and the interaction between Large 
owner and Cash holding deviation. The model in column 1 is a pooled OLS model. Column 2 has 
the same model with year dummies (omitted from table). Column 3 is an industry fixed effect 
model, and column 4 is an industry fixed effect model with year dummies. *, **. *** denote 
levels of significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 Dependent variable: CAR[-1, +1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank 2.94*** (1.01) 3.09*** (1.02) 3.26*** (1.04) 3.40*** (1.05) 
Governmental -0.02 (1.77) 0.16 (1.78) -0.17 (1.81) -0.05 (1.82) 
Large owner 1.24** (0.58) 1.34** (0.59) 1.12* (0.61) 1.20* (0.61) 
Cash holding deviation -1.83 (3.84) -1.88 (3.86) -2.15 (3.89) -2.12 (3.91) 
Bank * Large owner -0.84 (2.73) -1.00 (2.76) -0.87 (2.79) -1.06 (2.82) 
Governmental * Large owner -3.52 (2.32) -3.85 (2.34) -4.56* (2.43) -4.86** (2.46) 
Cash holding deviation * Large 
owner 
12.51* (6.52) 12.05* (6.55) 12.97* (6.67) 12.36* (6.70) 
Relative size 0.89*** (0.16) 0.89*** (0.16) 0.82*** (0.17) 0.82*** (0.17) 
Size -0.28** (0.13) -0.28** (0.13) -0.35*** (0.14) -0.35** (0.14) 
Shares -1.03 (1.09) -1.04 (1.09) -0.82 (1.12) -0.83 (1.12) 
Mixed -0.36 (0.65) -0.44 (0.67) -0.28 (0.66) -0.40 (0.68) 
Unknown -1.03 (0.75) -1.05 (0.76) -1.13 (0.76) -1.12 (0.77) 
Related -0.72 (0.57) -0.80 (0.57) -0.75 (0.59) -0.83 (0.59) 
Intercept 4.02*** (1.34) 3.49** (1.61)   
Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO YES NO YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 996 996 996 996 
R2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 
 
  




In Table 7.3 we reintroduce the Cash holding deviation variable along with Owner type and Large 
owner to test H10; that the presence of a strong owner does not affect acquisition performance, and 
H20 which states that firms with a Large owner does not manage excess cash reserves better.   
When we study Large owner in isolation, there is no practical difference between the models in 
Table 7.3 and the models in Table 7.2. Both in terms of statistical and economical significance. 
This means that Other performs better than a Large owner Other, all else equal. Moreover, since 
the interaction between Bank and Large owner is insignificant, the models predict that becoming 
a Large owner is equally positive for Bank and Other. The same is true for Government in the OLS 
models (model 1 and 2). However, as the Bank coefficient is significantly positive (between 2.94 
% in model 1 and 3.40 % in model 4), Banks start at a higher level, compared to the Other and 
Governmental.  
However, the interaction between Large owner and Governmental is significantly negative in the 
industry fixed effects models, on a 10 and 5 % level for models 3 and 4, respectively. Compared 
to Other, gaining Large owner status is negative for a Government in the fixed effects models. As 
such, there are one or more industries where companies generally perform better (worse), and these 
industries have a high (low) share of governmentally controlled companies in our sample. The net 
effect of gaining Large owner status where the largest owner is a Government is –3.44 % and –
3.66 % in models 3 and 4, respectively (βLarge Owner + βOwner Type: Governmental * Large Owner).  
In total, gaining Large owner status is positive for a Bank and Other, while it is positive for a 
Government in the OLS-models, however, negative in the fixed effects models. Thus, when we 
include Cash holding deviation, we can still reject H10 for a Bank and Other (relative to Table 7.2) 
at a 5 and 10 % level, dependent on which model (OLS or fixed effects) is applied. For a 
Government, we have ambiguous evidence whether we can reject H10. Applying OLS-models 
allow us to reject H10, however, in the fixed effects models, Large owner is negative for a 
Government.  
Moreover, in regression Table 7.1, which, as discussed in Table 7.2 could be affected by omitted 
bias, the coefficient for the interaction between Cash holding deviation and Large owner was 




insignificant in all models. After controlling for Owner type and its interaction with Large owner, 
we see that this interaction is significant at a 10 % level in all four models. As such, it gives 
supports against H20 that strong owners do not ensure better management of cash holdings with 
respect to takeover activity. This result applies for all Owner types as it is not triple interacted with 
Large owner and Cash holding deviation. 
Given a situation where a bidder has a strong owner and more cash than our cash holding-model 
predicts, acquisition performance will, all else equal, be better. Furthermore, as the Cash holding 
deviation variable is continuous, the models predict that firms which accumulate more ready cash 
are more likely to undertake better acquisitions. Accordingly, we observe evidence that bidder 
performance improves as Large owners actively monitor the management, and consequently that 
the bidder performance improves with cash holdings.  Moreover, this indicates that firms with a 
Large owner is more likely to exploit the benefits of having excess cash. They might be better at 
leveraging the financial flexibility the cash provides, or they might be less reliant on expensive 
external financing which makes financing less costly. However, as the level of significance is only 
10 %, we can only argue for a weak rejection of H20. 
Moreover, the control variables are in line with the literature previous findings in this thesis, which 
arguably increases the validity of the findings.  
  





Table 7.4: Model specification to test H3. Relative to Table 7.3, we split the Large owner variable 
into Large minority and Controlling majority to test H30. A firm has a Large minority owner 
when the largest shareholder has an ownership stake between 30-50 %, while it is defined as a 
Controlling majority in the case of owning more than 50 % of the firm. The model in column 1 
is a pooled OLS model. Column 2 has the same model with year dummies (omitted from table). 
Column 3 is an industry fixed effect model, and column 4 is an industry fixed effect model with 
year dummies. *, **. *** denote levels of significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 Dependent variable: CAR[-1, +1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank 2.92*** (1.01) 3.05*** (1.02) 3.27*** (1.04) 3.41*** (1.05) 
Governmental -0.01 (1.77) 0.16 (1.78) -0.14 (1.81) -0.03 (1.82) 
Large minority 1.14 (0.70) 1.28* (0.70) 1.11 (0.73) 1.21* (0.73) 
Controlling majority 1.37* (0.79) 1.42* (0.80) 1.16 (0.82) 1.19 (0.82) 
Cash holding deviation -1.81 (3.84) -1.85 (3.87) -2.20 (3.90) -2.18 (3.92) 
Bank * Large minority -0.31 (3.16) -0.78 (3.20) -0.73 (3.20) -1.27 (3.24) 
Governmental * Large minority -5.75** (2.87) -5.95** (2.89) -5.99** (2.94) -6.11** (2.96) 
Cash holding deviation * Large  
minority 
18.13** (7.96) 17.28** (8.00) 19.64** (8.17) 18.61** (8.20) 
Bank * Controlling majority -1.66 (4.93) -1.01 (4.98) -0.89 (5.09) -0.14 (5.12) 
Governmental * Controlling 
majority 
-1.79 (2.71) -2.17 (2.73) -2.99 (2.93) -3.43 (2.96) 
Cash holding deviation * 
Controlling majority 
4.65 (8.98) 4.78 (9.01) 4.11 (9.13) 4.07 (9.17) 
Relative size 0.89*** (0.16) 0.89*** (0.16) 0.82*** (0.17) 0.82*** (0.17) 
Size -0.29** (0.13) -0.29** (0.13) -0.36*** (0.14) -0.35** (0.14) 
Related -0.80 (0.57) -0.86 (0.58) -0.81 (0.59) -0.88 (0.59) 
Shares -1.10 (1.09) -1.10 (1.10) -0.84 (1.12) -0.84 (1.12) 
Mixed -0.33 (0.66) -0.41 (0.67) -0.22 (0.67) -0.33 (0.68) 
Unknown -1.05 (0.75) -1.07 (0.76) -1.13 (0.77) -1.12 (0.78) 
Intercept 3.96*** (1.36) 3.45** (1.62)   
Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO YES NO YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 996 996 996 996 
R2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 




When we split Large owner into Large minority and Controlling majority, a bidder will always be 
either or neither. As such, these variable definitions cover the entire range of ownership fractions. 
For a Large minority we can accordingly view the Large minority coefficients, and for a 
Controlling majority we assess the Controlling majority coefficients. We assess the outcome of 
H3 by comparing the Large minority coefficients with the Controlling majority coefficients. 
Note that the Large minority variable is of owner type Other by default as in the previous 
regression tables concerning Large owner. The increase we observe in the coefficient of Large 
minority is thus the effect of increasing the ownership stake of the largest shareholder with owner 
type Other to Large minority levels. The same is true for the variable Controlling majority 
discussed later in this section. 
Firstly, we observe that Large minority (30-50 %) has a significant and positive effect on abnormal 
stock return when we introduce year fixed effects in our models (2) and (4). This observation is in 
line with our expectation as we hypothesized that a large shareholder would monitor the 
management in order to ensure value-enhancing acquisitions. Our regression indicates that when 
the largest shareholder has an ownership stake of 30 – 50 %, we can expect an increase in abnormal 
stock return of about 1.21 - 1.28 %, relative to an ownership fraction of below 30 %. However, we 
do regard this result as somewhat weak as it is only significantly different from 0 % in the year 
fixed effects models. 
Bank has an estimated extra gain of between 2.92 % (model 1) to 3.41 % (model 4), significant at 
the 1 % level in all models. However, while Bank’s start at a higher level than Other, we see no 
difference in abnormal stock return when we interact Large minority with owner type Bank, 
compared to owner type Other. We do, however, observe a clear negative association with Large 
minority and Governmental owner type. The interaction has a significantly negative influence at 
abnormal stock returns at a 5 % level in all models in Table 7.4. We observe that the presence of 
a Large minority Governmental owner is associated with a decrease in abnormal stock return of 6 
%, which is quite an impact.  




From this we infer that a Governmental Large minority is more likely to be a passive shareholder, 
and thus less likely to actively monitor the management’s decisions. Consequently, firms with 
Governmental Large minority owner performs worse as the management are given more freedom 
to undertake value-destroying acquisitions to serve their own interests at the expense of 
shareholders. Additionally, Nordic governments have often other priorities than to solely 
maximize shareholder value. This could be equal gender treatment, sustainability or other 
initiatives that promotes welfare for society (Norwegian Government, 2021). This might also 
explain the negative results for Large minority owners of Governmental owner type in addition to 
the lack of active monitoring. 
Moreover, one highly interesting result in Table 7.4 is the effect of a Large minority and Cash 
holding deviation on bidder performance. The coefficient shows an impactful and positive effect 
which is significant at a 5 % level. A 10-percentage point increase in a firm’s cash holdings relative 
to predicted cash holdings is associated with a ~2 % increase in abnormal stock return during the 
event window. Previous literature (Huang et al., 2013; Oler & Waegelein, 2011) has indicated that 
there are potential benefits of having access to large amounts of ready cash, and our results indicate 
that firms are better at utilizing these in the presence of a Large minority shareholder.  
In Table A.2.2 in Appendix A.2 we investigate the triple interaction between Large minority, Cash 
holding deviation and Owner type. The result is that the interaction is positively and significantly 
correlated with all Owner types. However, a Government Large minority seems to be especially 
good at reaping the benefits of excess cash.  
Next, we observe that Controlling majority is significantly positive at a 10 % level in the OLS 
models, column 1 and 2. The models shows that when a firm has a Controlling majority, we can 
expect a 1.37-1.42 % increase in abnormal stock return during the event window, all else equal. 
Since the interaction between Controlling majority and the Owner types are insignificant, this is 
the estimated increase in abnormal returns we expect for all Owner types. We find this observation 
as evidence, although somewhat weak, against H10.  




A Controlling majority has the strongest incentives to monitor management and make sure that 
acquisitions are value-enhancing. In addition, they have complete control of the decision-making 
process which enables them to influence the management to undertake acquisitions that maximize 
shareholder value. It is therefore not surprising to observe a significant, positive effect on the 
abnormal stock return in the presence of a Controlling majority.  
Furthermore, we note that the interactions between Controlling majority and Cash holding 
deviation are insignificant in all models. Thus, the models predict that Controlling majorities 
manage their excess cash reserves no better than bidders with dispersed ownership.   
When comparing Large minority with Controlling majority, we see no substantial difference in 
neither statistical nor economic significance. Large minority is significantly positive at the 10 % 
level in the models with year fixed effects (model 2 and 4), while Controlling majority is 
significantly positive at the 10 % level in both OLS models (model 1 and 2).  
Next, a noteworthy difference between Large minority and Controlling majority is the interaction 
with Governmental owner type. When interacted with Large minority we see a clear negative 
impact in all models. However, this is no longer true when the government has acquired a 
Controlling majority position. While the default owner type Other and Bank seem to have positive 
incremental gains with respect to abnormal returns by gaining either Large minority or Controlling 
majority status, only the latter is true for Governmental. This observation does give some, although 
not much, support against H30.  
Our models clearly indicate that Large minority owners are better at utilizing excess cash reserves 
than Controlling majority owners, regardless of Owner type. This evidence is found when we 
compare Large minority’s and Controlling majority’s interaction with Cash holding deviation. 
Note that a Controlling majority does not manage excess cash any better than bidders with 
dispersed ownership concentration, in that its interaction with Cash holding deviation is not 
significantly negative. It is interesting to observe when we consider the fact that Controlling 
majority bidders in theory have the most incentives to actively monitor the management due to 
their substantial cash flow rights and influence in the decision-making process. Accordingly, this 




may be an indication that when a single shareholder gets too much, or complete control, they are 
more likely to exploit their position for personal gains at the expense of minority shareholders.   
The result does give support to recent emerging theories of principal-principal costs, and as such 
might be regarded as evidence against H30. According to theory, when a single shareholder 
becomes too large, principal-principal costs will arise (Johnson et al., 2000). As we explained 
earlier, these are costs that arise due to conflicting incentives between majority and minority 
shareholders. When one shareholder has absolute control and access to large amounts of cash, our 
data implies that the management are not undertaking optimal actions that is in the best interests 
of the shareholders, at least when we compare them to firms with a Large minority which lack 
absolute control.   
In this context, there are several ways a Controlling majority owner may interfere in the bidding 
process that may lead to lower bidder performance. One way may be that the Controlling majority 
owner value control, and thus is reluctant to give it up. This might lead to worse bidder 
performance if the owner avoids issuance of new shares to finance an acquisition even when it is 
optimal, as hypothesized by Kim and Jung (2019).  
Another potential reason could be that firms with a Large minority owner is more likely to have 
other shareholders of reasonable size with incentives to perform active monitoring. Hence, the 
likelihood that active monitoring occurs at all increase. As the likeliness of active monitoring 
increase, so should the expected abnormal stock return of acquisitions.  
Alternatively, the Controlling majority may use their influence to execute acquisitions that benefit 
themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. This might be self-interested motives such as 
empire-building or the pursuit of pet projects, similarly to what we discussed in relation to 
principal-agent conflicts. It might also be that the Controlling majority is more likely to influence 
the management to acquire firms where they have financial interests. Potentially, this could be a 
way of extracting corporate resources for their own benefit.  




In general, we expected to see better bidder performance by firms with concentrated ownership, 
particularly of firms with excess cash reserves. Our interpretation of past literature was that the 
presence of a large, active owner seemed to be ideal in order to exploit the financial flexibility to 
undertake growth opportunities as they present themselves in addition to the freedom from 
expensive external financing that excess cash reserves provide. However, it seems like this may 
not be the case when the largest shareholder becomes too large and has complete control as in the 
case of a Controlling majority.   
This observation introduces a further insight regarding H2. It seems like we can only reject H20 
for Large minorities, and not reject H20 for Controlling majorities. However, this is a nuance we 
did not consider in the hypothesis design, accordingly, we do not separate the two distinctions 
from each other. The hypothesis considers concentrated ownership, in general. Thus, we still reject 
H20. 
The observation that Large minorities manage excess reserves better than a Controlling majority 
serves as evidence to reject H30. However, to be confident enough to reject H30 we require more 
direct evidence. That is, evidence of differences in the Large minority and Controlling majority 
coefficients (and/or their interactions with Owner type), that favor a Large minority. For these 
coefficients we see little to no difference, except when the owner is a Government, where the 
models prefer a Controlling majority. Thus, due to insufficient evidence, we do not reject H30.  




8  Robustness 
Another source of decreased robustness is multicollinearity in the explanatory variables. 
Intuitively, the most likely source of multicollinearity are the relative size and log size variables 
as both to some extent address the size of the bidder. If the bidder is large, log size is large, and 
relative size is small. However, two arguments mitigate the likelihood of multicollinearity. Larger 
bidders will usually acquire larger targets. Consequently, the relative size variable will not vary 
too much dependent on bidder size. Additionally, we expressed relative size as deal value divided 
by market capitalization, as opposed to total assets (in the denominator), which is used as log size, 
to handle multicollinearity.  
To statistically test whether multicollinearity issues are present regardless in our analysis, we 
perform a variance inflation factor (VIF) test on model/column 2 in Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 These 
two tables contain the preferred specifications, with regards to the independent variables, to test 
our hypotheses. As multicollinearity regards the independent variables a VIF analysis of the OLS 
model will suffice as its conclusions should apply for the fixed effects model as well. This claim 
holds if the industries or industries-years combinations in and of itself cannot explain the variation 
in one of the independent variables.  
The result of test is available in Appendix A.4. The presence of multicollinearity is assessed by 
considering the size of the VIF for the individual variables. The VIF value in our models is 3.171 
and 3.095. Contrary to what we expected, the test concludes that the most likely source of 
collinearity is owner type and its intersection with concentrated ownership. However, the size of 
the VIF do not indicate that our models have multicollinearity issues. Commonly, a cut-off of 5 or 
10 is used, where higher values indicate multicollinearity issues. Resultingly, we do not consider 
multicollinearity to be an issue in our analysis which, arguably, increases the robustness of the 
conclusions.  
We have executed measures to increase robustness, including removal of influential observations 
in the dependent variables. Regarding the independent variables, there are very few sources of 
outliers. Moreover, we defined our variables in ways which would decrease the likelihood of 




multicollinearity, and statistical testing concludes that it is not present in our preferred models. 
Resultingly, we argue that the conclusions in the analysis are robust. 
  




9  Weakness 
The ownership data introduces potential shortfalls in our analysis due to measurement errors. Orbis 
collects ownership data throughout the year, which means that observations are spread out in any 
given year – some are collected in January, others in December, and all in between. The way in 
which Orbis provides the ownership data for its users forced us to aggregate it by year. Thus, 
relative to the data in which an acquisition is announced, the ownership data point is potentially 
lagged up to two years. To illustrate say an acquisition is announced in late December 2019, that 
observation is then linked with the ownership data from 2018. If the largest ownership fraction of 
that bidder was observed in January, then the data points are almost two years apart. Vice versa, 
the timespan between the two data points could be as close as one month. The former scenario is 
the one which possibly cause measurement errors. Two years is such a long time that the 
probability of a change in ownership fraction, possibly even the largest shareholder, is high.  
Furthermore, the ownership data structure in Orbis made it difficult to reasonably research 
aggregate specifications (sum of n largest shareholders) of concentrated ownership, as doing so 
would arguably significantly increase probability and extent of measurement error. It is possible 
that such specifications either increased or decreased the significance of the variables in the 
regressions. In either case, that would unveil information regarding the conclusion's robustness to 
variable specification. Given how fundamental the ownership fraction variable is in this thesis, 
researching aggregate specification would provide us with valuable information.  
  




10  Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have studied the effects of strong owners on acquisition performance. As strong 
owners have more incentives to monitor the management, we expected acquisition performance to 
be better, in general (H1). In addition, there are strong arguments and empirical evidence that firms 
with large excess cash reserves perform worse in acquisitions. However, we expected bidders with 
strong owners would be able to make use of the benefits ready cash gives to make better 
acquisitions (H2). Finally, more recent literature point to principal-principal issues when owners 
get too much control. Accordingly, we wanted to test that in our sample as well (H3). 
The final sample consisted of 1,083 acquisitions in the Nordics, by in total, 439 unique bidders. 
Furthermore, as the testing methodology require a wide array of variables, we have used several 
data sources to acquire the final sample: BvD, Compustat, CRSP and Datastream.  
To test the hypotheses, we designed and regressed relevant and control variables on bidders’ 
abnormal announcement returns.  The answer to the hypotheses is thus to be found in the sign and 
significance level of the coefficients.  
In our first model specification in regression Table 7.1, we found no significant results of interest. 
The model concludes that we, even on the 10 % level, cannot reject H10 nor H20. As such, there is 
no significant evidence in support of our hypotheses in the models applied in Table 7.1. 
In Table 7.2 we found that that Owner type has significant explanatory power on abnormal 
announcement returns (the dependent variable). Bank is significant at the 1 % level, and the 
interaction between Large owner and Government is significant at the 10 % level in the industry 
fixed effects models. Thus, we inferred that Owner type affects CAR. Furthermore, when we 
included Owner type, the Large owner coefficients was significant at the 5 and 10 % level – which 
is strong evidence in favor of rejecting H10. This, along with additional evidence in the descriptive 
summary (section 6) led us to conclude that Owner type is correlated with both the dependent 
variable and Large owner. Standard econometric theory dictates that such variables must be 
included in the regression model, as otherwise, omitted bias is possible.  




By including Owner type as a variable, relative to the models in regression Table 7.1, we see that 
the Large owner coefficient (~1.2 %) is significantly positive at a 5 % and 10 % level for the OLS 
and industry fixed effects models, respectively. Thus, we can reject H10, and conclude that the 
presence of a strong owner affects acquisition performance, and positively so.  
Furthermore, to evaluate H20 we noted that the interaction between Cash holding deviation and 
Large owner is significantly positive at a 5 % level in all models in Table 7.3. As such, we have 
sufficient evidence to reject H20 and conclude that strong owners are better at ensuring that the 
management make better use of large cash holdings, and thus improve bidder performance. Note 
that as Cash holding deviation is a continuous variable, the models predict that as Large owners 
accumulate more and more cash, abnormal announcement returns increases.  
In Table 7.4 we evaluated the outcome of H3 by comparing the coefficients of Large minority (30-
50 % ownership fraction) to the coefficients of Controlling majority (≥50 %). The difference in 
both the significance and size of Large minority and Controlling majority were insubstantial. 
However, in the interactions with Owner type, we saw that the models slightly preferred a 
Controlling majority. This evidence dictates that we cannot reject H30. However, regarding the 
interactions with Cash holding deviation, we found that only Large minorities extracts the benefits 
of accumulating excess cash. This is evidence in favor of rejecting H30, however, this evidence 
alone is not sufficient to reject H30.  
We propose that future research could investigate this hypothesis further, given that we found 
ambiguous results. Research solely focused on testing this hypothesis could try other testing 
strategies and specifications of the relevant variables.   
  





A.1 – Variable name and definitions 
 
Variable Description Source/input 
Abnormal return (AR) Abnormal return for security i 
at time t is calculated as 
return on security i subtracted 
by the market return at time t. 
CRSP & Datastream 
Cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) 
The cumulative sum of 
abnormal returns of security i 
during a space of periods (for 
instance n number of days). 
CRSP & Datastream 
Cash holding Cash divided by total assets. Compustat, Eckbo, Makaew, 
& Thorburn. (2018) 
Cash holding deviation The residual of the Cash 
holding model. Variable used 
to proxy excess cash in our 
analysis.  
Eckbo, Makaew, & Thorburn. 
(2018) 
Controlling majority A scenario where one entity 




Deal value Includes actual value, if 
disclosed, plus the equity 
value, enterprise value, a 
modelled enterprise value 
based on the company’s 
financials, total target value 
plus the native deal currency. 
BvD 
Deal payment type Method of payment. Our 
sample consists of: cash, 
stock, mixed and unknown – 
as defined by BvD.  
BvD 
Large minority A scenario where one entity 




Large owner A scenario where one entity 




Market capitalization Shares outstanding * share 
price 
Compustat & CRSP 




M/B Market capitalization prior 
year-end divided by net assets 
prior year-end. 
Compustat & CRSP 
Missing R&D A dummy variable equal to 1 
if R&D data is missing, 0 
otherwise. 
Eckbo, Makaew, & Thorburn. 
(2018) 
Operating efficiency A formula for operating 
efficiency as defined in 
section 3.2. Used in regression 
to determine modelled cash 
holdings.   
Eckbo, Makaew, & Thorburn. 
(2018) 
Orbis BvD’s M&A database BvD 
Owner type What type of entity the largest 
owner is, as defined by BvD. 
Originally had more levels, 
but we aggregated it to 3: 
Bank, Governmental and 
Other.  
BvD 
Related Dummy variable, equal to 1 if 
acquiror and target has equal 
4-digit NACE code, 0 
otherwise 
BvD 
Relative size Deal value divided by market 
capitalization prior year-end 
BvD & Compustat 
R&D R&D expense Compustat 
Size Natural log of total assets Compustat 
Zephyr BvD’s Ownership database BvD 
  




A.2 - Triple interaction models  
 
Table A.2.1: Results from triple interaction model, investigates where effects found in table 7.3 
originate from. *, **. *** denote levels of significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 Dependent variable: 
 CAR[-1, +1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank 2.92*** (1.01) 3.06*** (1.02) 3.25*** (1.05) 3.39*** (1.06) 
Governmental 0.01 (1.77) 0.17 (1.78) -0.15 (1.81) -0.05 (1.82) 
Large owner 1.23** (0.59) 1.33** (0.59) 1.12* (0.61) 1.20* (0.61) 
Cash Holding Deviation -1.86 (4.48) -1.74 (4.51) -1.69 (4.54) -1.55 (4.57) 
Relative size 0.89*** (0.16) 0.90*** (0.16) 0.82*** (0.17) 0.83*** (0.17) 
Size -0.28** (0.13) -0.28** (0.13) -0.36*** (0.14) -0.35** (0.14) 
Shares -1.13 (1.10) -1.14 (1.10) -0.90 (1.12) -0.92 (1.12) 
Mixed -0.38 (0.66) -0.47 (0.67) -0.31 (0.67) -0.44 (0.68) 
Unknown -1.02 (0.75) -1.04 (0.76) -1.12 (0.77) -1.11 (0.77) 
Related -0.73 (0.57) -0.81 (0.58) -0.76 (0.59) -0.84 (0.59) 
Bank * Large owner -4.83 (4.56) -5.25 (4.59) -4.57 (4.63) -5.02 (4.66) 
Governmental * Large owner -3.80 (2.33) -4.11* (2.35) -4.94** (2.45) -5.22** (2.47) 
Bank * Cash holding deviation 1.50 (8.81) 0.81 (8.90) -0.14 (8.94) -0.59 (9.02) 
Governmental * Cash holding 
deviation 
-34.06 (37.87) -30.45 (38.00) -36.61 (38.17) -33.05 (38.31) 
Cash Holding Deviation * Large 
owner 
11.81* (6.98) 11.25 (7.01) 11.50 (7.15) 10.81 (7.18) 
Bank * Large  owner *  









Governmental * Large owner *  
Cash holding deviation 
76.77 (52.21) 71.60 (52.48) 89.05* (52.96) 84.92 (53.24) 
Intercept 4.01*** (1.34) 3.48** (1.61)   
Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO YES NO YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 996 996 996 996 








Table A.2.2: Results from triple interaction model, investigates where effects found in Table 
7.4 originate from. *, **. *** denote levels of significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bank 2.89*** (1.01) 3.04*** (1.02) 3.25*** (1.05) 3.41*** (1.06) 
Governmental 0.02 (1.77) 0.17 (1.78) -0.14 (1.81) -0.05 (1.82) 
Large minority 1.13 (0.70) 1.27* (0.70) 1.09 (0.73) 1.20 (0.73) 
Cash Holding Deviation -1.90 (4.48) -1.80 (4.50) -1.79 (4.55) -1.69 (4.57) 
Controlling majority 1.37* (0.79) 1.43* (0.80) 1.17 (0.82) 1.21 (0.82) 
Bank * Large minority -3.06 (5.07) -3.75 (5.10) -3.19 (5.14) -3.88 (5.17) 
Governmental * Large minority -6.13** (2.87) -6.34** (2.89) -6.28** (2.94) -6.41** (2.96) 
Bank * Cash holding deviation 1.47 (8.81) 0.85 (8.89) -0.09 (8.94) -0.46 (9.03) 









Large minority * Cash holding 
deviation 
16.15* (8.40) 14.99* (8.44) 17.09** (8.62) 15.80* (8.66) 







Governmental * Controlling 
majority 
-1.33 (2.75) -1.59 (2.77) -2.35 (3.04) -2.59 (3.06) 
Controlling majority * Cash holding 
deviation 
5.63 (9.31) 5.83 (9.34) 4.22 (9.47) 4.30 (9.50) 









Governmental * Large minority * 

















Governmental * Controlling 








Relative size 0.89*** (0.16) 0.90*** (0.16) 0.83*** (0.17) 0.83*** (0.17) 
Size -0.30** (0.13) -0.29** (0.13) -0.37*** (0.14) -0.36*** (0.13) 
Shares -1.22 (1.10) -1.23 (1.10) -0.95 (1.12) -0.96 (1.12) 
Mixed -0.39 (0.66) -0.50 (0.67) -0.28 (0.67) -0.42 (0.68) 
Unknown -1.06 (0.76) -1.09 (0.76) -1.13 (0.77) -1.12 (0.78) 
Related -0.83 (0.58) -0.91 (0.58) -0.83 (0.59) -0.91 (0.59) 
Intercept 3.90*** (1.37) 3.35** (1.63)   
Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO YES NO YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 996 996 996 996 
R2 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 




A.3 - Cash holding deviation regression model 
 
Model A.3.1: Results from Cash holding deviation regression model. *, **. *** denote levels of 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Cash holdings 
Intercept 0.32*** (0.02) 
Log Size -0.01*** (0.001) 
Operating Efficiency -0.0000 (0.0000) 
M/B 0.002*** (0.0005) 
Leverage -0.56*** (0.03) 
R&D 0.41*** (0.04) 
Missing R&D -0.001 (0.01) 
Industry FE YES 
Observations 1,083 
R2 0.46 
Adjusted R2 0.44 
 
  




A.4 - VIF tests 
 
 
VIF test on model 2 in Table 6.3 
 VIF 
Owner type 3.091 
Large Owner 1.225 
Cash holding deviation 1.586 
Relative size 1.073 
Log Size 1.481 
Deal payment type 1.362 
Related 1.021 
Acquiror country 1.259 
Year 1.328 
Owner type * Large Owner  3.171 
Large Owner * Cash holding deviation 1.559 
 
VIF test on model 2 in Table 6.4 
 VIF 
Owner type 3.095 
Large minority  1.283 
Cash holding deviation 1.586 
Controlling majority  1.292 
Relative size 1.074 
Log Size 1.497 
Related 1.029 
Deal payment type 1.383 
Acquiror country 1.347 
Year 1.380 
Owner type * Large minority 2.043 
Large minority * Cash holding deviation 1.336 
Owner type * Controlling majority 2.248 
Cash holding deviation * Controlling majority 1.253 
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